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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
RAEGAN DANIELLE FRANCIS, 
individually, and as the 
Personal Representative of 
the Estate of Edward Kenneth 
Francis, Jr., deceased, 
Plaintiff and Appellee, 
vs. 
EDWARD K. FRANCIS, SR., and 
PATRICIA BLUNDON FRANCIS, 
Defendants and Appellants. 
Court of Appeals No. 970651-CA 
Priority No. 15 
(Oral Argument Requested) 
BRIEF OF APPELLANTS 
Jurisdiction 
The jurisdiction of the Utah Court of Appeals is invoked 
pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(j) (1996) and Utah R. 
App. P. 42. 
Statement of Issues 
Was any behavior by Defendants preceding or following the 
suicide of their son "outrageous behavior11 sufficient to 
support an award of damages for intentional infliction of 
emotional distress. 
Did ..ny behavior on the part of Defendant cause Plaintiff's 
severe emotional distress. 
Can an award of damages for conversion be sustained absent 
evidence of fair market value. 
4. Can an award of damages for conversion be sustained absent 
evidence of a demand for the return of the allegedly 
converted property. 
5. Were the trial court's findings of fact relative to the 
values of allegedly converted property clearly erroneous. 
Standard of Appellate Review 
Issue One presents a mixed question of fact and law. In 
reviewing a mixed question of fact and law, the trial 
determinations of fact are reviewed under the "clearly erroneous" 
standard. Ultimate conclusions, as well as conclusions of law 
are reviewed for correctness, with no deference given to the 
finder of fact. State v. Pena. 869 P.2d 932, 932, 938 (Utah 
1994); Trolley Square Assos. v. Nielson. 886 P.2d 61, 65 (Utah 
Ct. App. 1994). 
Issues Two, Five, and Six present questions of fact. The 
appeals court reviews questions of fact under a clearly erroneous 
standard, setting them aside when there is not substantial 
evidence to justify the finding. Alta Indus. Ltd. v. Hurst. 846 
P.2d 1282, 1286 (Utah 1993); Klinger v. Knightly. 889 P.2d 1372, 
1381 (Utah Ct. App. 1995); House v. Armour of America. 856 P.2d 
542, 551 (Utah Ct. App. 1994); Utah R.Civ. P. 52. 
Issues Three and Four present questions of law. Questions 
of law are reviewed for correctness, giving no deference to the 
determination made by the trial court. jQuflas Vt FQX Television 
Stations. Inc.. 927 P.2d 170, 174 (Utah 1996); Harline v- Barker/ 
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912 P.2d 433, 438 (Utah 1996); Nelson v. Betit. 937 P.2d 1298, 
1300 (Utah Ct. App. 1997). 
Determinativ statutory Provisions 
The issues in this case pertain to the common law doctrines 
of intentional infliction of emotional distress and conversion. 
There are no determinative statutory provisions in this case. 
Statement of the Case 
Nature Qf the Case 
Plaintiff/Appellee filed a complaint in the Sixth Judicial 
District Court for Sevier County. Plaintiff brought this action 
following the tragic suicide of her husband, Edward Kenneth 
Francis, Jr., who was also the son of the Defendants. Plaintiff 
sought a money judgement against her former in-laws under three 
separate causes of action: (1) intentional infliction of 
emotional distress; (2) conversion; and (3) money had and 
received. Following a bench trial, the trial court awarded 
judgement in favor of the Plaintiff and against the Defendants on 
Plaintiff's two tort theories. It is from this judgement that 
the Defendants appeal. 
Course of Proceedings Below and Disposition 
Plaintiff filed a complaint on 4 May 1994. Discovery was 
conducted, and a trial was held on 14 and 15 November 1996. The 
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trial court issued an 18 page written decision which was entered 
23 January 1997.1 A judgement was prepared and entered by the 
court on 9 May 1997. Notice of appeal was filed on 2 June 1997. 
It is from the trial court's decision and the judgement based 
thereupon that Plaintiff!s appeal. True and correct copies of 
the Memorandum Decision and the Judgment are attached hereto as 
Appendices A and B, respectively. 
Statement Qf Facts 
1. The decedent, Edward Kenneth Francis, Jr., was the son of 
Defendants and the husband of Plaintiff. To distinguish him 
from his father, Defendant Edward Francis, he was called 
"Little Ed." Trial Transcript, pp. 45-46 
2. Little Ed was born in 1968 in South Dakota and graduated 
from Payson High School, in Utah County, in 1986. He 
suffered from a life-long affliction of mild spastic 
cerebral palsy, which affected primarily his left side. As 
a result of his cerebral palsy, Little Ed was unable to hold 
a steady job and had difficulty with the use of his left 
hand. While he could hold things in his left hand, he had 
difficulty picking things up with it, particularly small 
object on flat surfaces, like a pencil or a nail on a table 
1. The Plaintiff/Appellee did not prepare Findings of Fact 
and Conclusions of Law but merely submitted a judgment. The 
trial court's Memorandum Decision contains an extensive review of 
the facts. See Memorandum Decision, attached hereto as Appendix 
A. 
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top. Prior to and during the course of his marriage to 
Plaintiff, Little Ed worked for perhaps three months as a 
carpet layer!s assistant. He ultimately had to be 
terminated in November 1993, around the time he and 
Plaintiff wed. Trial Transcript, pp. 303, 308-09, 317-20, 
348-49. 
In July, 1993, Little Ed met Plaintiff, Raegan Francis. 
They became intimate, and by 11 September 1993, Raegan was 
pregnant. Raegan and Little Ed were married by a justice of 
the peace in Richfield, Sevier County Utah, on 12 November 
1993. At the time of the marriage, Little Ed had been 
divorced once but had no children. Raegan had not been 
married previously, but had an eighteen month old child. 
Raegan was 17; Little Ed was 26. Immediately following 
their marriage, Little Ed and Raegan lived with her parents 
for a brief tirr Aurora, Utah, a few miles from Salina. 
This was an unsatisfactory arrangement, and within the 
month, Little Ed and Raegan moved in with Defendants. Trial 
Transcript, pp. 47-52, 58 
Defendants determined to assist Little Ed and Raegan in the 
purchase of a home. In January 1994, Defendants purchased a 
home in Sigurd, Utah, a few miles from their home in Salina. 
They allowed Little Ed and Raegan to live in the home, 
provided they paid rent. Defendants used the rent in turn 
to pay the mortgage. Little Ed and Raegan moved into the 
home in January 1994 and made a single rent payment for the 
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month of February 1994. Significantly, neither Little Ed 
nor Raegan paid any rent for March, 1994. Trial Transcript, 
pp. 59, 62-64. 
5. The relationship between Little Ed and Raegan was chaotic 
and stormy. Raegan was not mentally stable.2 Raegan 
reported, without any corroboration, that Little Ed was 
controlling, abusive and unfaithful to her. Their marriage 
was marked by disharmony, acrimony, poor relations with 
their respective in-laws, and even suicidal behavior from 
the beginning, although Raegan testified that there were 
periods of happiness as well. App. D; App. E; Trial 
Trnascript, pp. 53-57; 66-74. 
6. Shortly following their marriage, both Little Ed and Raegan 
quit or lost their jobs. Their sole source of income was 
public assistance payments and disability benefits which 
Little Ed received as a result of his disability. The only 
other source of income was a very substantial amount of 
money which Defendants provided to Raegan and Little Ed and 
Defendants1 efforts on behalf of their son and his wife to 
purchase a home, finance the purchase on their own credit, 
and provide funds and property to furnish the house. Trial 
Transcript, pp. 62-64, 116-68, 276-77, 279-81, 308-09; 317. 
7. Little Ed and Raegan!s relationship came to a violent, 
lonely end. On 16 March 1994, Little Ed and Raegan had a 
2. See Statement of Fact, 1 34. 
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bitter quarrel. Raegan decided to move from the Sigurd home 
and began to pack things. The argument continued throughout 
most of the day on 16 March. At some point, both Little Ed 
and Raegan called their respective parents and police 
officers were present at least twice during the day. Raegan 
began to pack items to take with her and a dispute arose 
regarding what was to be taken. Trial Transcript, pp. 68-
75; 110-114, 238. 
Raegan ultimately removed a carload and two pickup loads of 
material from the home on 16 March 1994. There were violent 
confrontations between Little Ed and Raegan, and their 
respective parents on 16 March 1994. At some point during 
the day, Raegan and Defendant Patricia Francis had a 
confrontation in the kitchen of the Sigurd home. Mrs. 
Francis attempted to get the telephone receiver away from 
Raegan, and they both fell to the floor wrestling. Raegan 
ended on top of Mrs. Francis. At one point on Wednesday, 16 
March 1994, Plaintiff's mother had become enraged. She was 
in the living room of the Sigurd home. In her rage she 
kicked the gun cabinet, breaking the glass and the door 
frame. Trial Transcript, pp. 69-78, 266-67, 306-08, 320-22, 
337, 366-70. 
At another point on 16 March 1994, a Sevier County Deputy 
Sheriff named Jack Peterson was present at the Sigurd home. 
He was assisting Raegan in gathering certain items to remove 
from the home and was alone with her in a bedroom. In an 
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effort to make conversation and diffuse Raeganfs tense mood, 
he offhandedly asked her about her children and about her 
obvious pregnancy. Raegan told Deputy Peterson that the 
two-year-old child was not Little Edfs, and moreover, that 
Little Ed was not the father of her unborn child. Upon 
questioning from the officer, Raegan reported that she had 
not yet told Little Ed. Deputy Peterson advised Raegan not 
to mention the paternity at that time give the agitated 
situation. Raegan denied this conversation occured. 
Notwithstanding the officerfs advise, as she was leaving the 
Sigurd home on Wednesday, 16 March 1994, Raegan yelled for 
all to hear, including Little Ed, that Little Ed was not the 
father of the unborn child. Raegan testified that she made 
this remark for the express purpose of upsetting Little Ed. 
Trial Transcript, pp. 233-36; 73-74, 376-77. 
10. Approximately a week prior to this confrontation, Raegan and 
Little Ed together with Defendants, and Little Ed's brother 
in-law, John Ore, installed a fence at the Sigurd home. At 
one point John Ore and Raegan were alone. Raegan reported 
to John Ore that Little Ed was not the father of her unborn 
child. John responded that Raegan ought to tell Little Ed, 
but took no actions to tell Little Ed himself. Raegan 
denied this conversation occured. Trial Transcript, pp. 
241-42, 245, 376-77. 
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Following the confrontation with their respective parents 
Raegan and Little Ed met later in the evening 16 March 1994, 
and continued discussion through the morning of Thursday, 17 
March 1994. By early morning, it was apparent that they 
could not resolve their differences. Raegan reported that 
Little Ed gave her an ultimatum that she stop seeing her 
parents or get out. Raegan requested to be taken back to 
her parent's home in Aurora. Raegan gave Little Ed her 
wedding ring. Trial Transcript, pp. 79-82, 181. 
Little Ed had continued to be upset and concerned about 
Raeganfs claim that the unborn child Raegan was carrying was 
not his. According to Raegan, he asked at least three times 
during the course of this conversation whether the child was 
his. In response to each question, Raegan assured Little Ed 
that the unborn child was his. She claimed that Little Ed 
and her made their peace before separating on Thursday 
morning. Trial Transcript, pp. 82, 376-78. 
Later, on Thursday, 17 March 1994, Little Ed hitched and 
drove with a small utility trailer to his parents home in 
Salina. He retrieved certain items of property owned by him 
and Raegan. He had the entire utility trailer loaded with 
property. Other than a baby crib, Defendants were unable to 
see what property was in the trailer. When questioned what 
he was doing, Little Ed responded that the marriage was over 
and that he was throwing things away. Apparently, Little Ed 
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drove to the county landfill and disposed of the items in 
the trailer. Defendants made no response and did not assist 
Little Ed in this endeavor. Trial Transcript, pp. 331. 
14• In the evening of Thursday, 17 March 1994, Little Ed called 
his father, Defendant Ed Francis, and asked him to come 
visit with him. Mr. Francis left his home, and drove the 
few miles to Sigurd. They talked for about an hour. They 
discussed how Little Ed was feeling, the impending divorce, 
and other items a son and a father would discuss. Defendant 
Ed Francis kept medication for Little Ed's use and benefit. 
Little Ed asked for a sleeping pill, which Ed Francis 
provided to him. Mr. Francis saw his son get into bed, said 
goodbye and left. He never saw his son again. Trial 
Transcript, pp. 346-47; 35. 
15. The next morning Little Ed arose and walked to a nearby 
general store. He purchased some cigarettes, and walked 
back home. Evidently he took a shower, and while wrapped in 
a towel sat on one of the rocking chairs in his home, loaded 
a Winchester .30-30 rifle with a single bullet. He pulled 
the trigger and died from a single gunshot wound to the 
head. See Rolin Report; admitted at trial as Plaintiff's 
Exhibit 21. Trial Transcript, pp. 118-22. 
16. The same morning, 18 March 1994, Raegan decided to visit 
Little Ed. She attempted to find friends to go with her, 
but her friends were preparing to go to the prom that 
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evening. She arrived alone at the Sigurd home at 
approximately 11:00 A.M. She sensed an eery stillness. She 
looked around and knocked on the door, but no one appeared 
to let her in. She let herself in the back door, and walked 
into the kitchen. She called for Little Ed, but no one 
answered. As she walked through the kitchen, she first saw 
a pair of legs, and walked into the living room to find 
Little Ed's body. Trial Transcript, pp. 83-88. 
17. Raegan was the first person to discover the grisly death 
scene of her husband. She returned to the kitchen and found 
a note in Little Ed's handwriting. The note said: 
Ask for my Dad Ed Francis 
To the person that fine this letter it go to My Mom & 
Dad 
Their number is 529-7322 well that is about it 
Love you Mom & Dad But I can't go on in life asking 
more 
Because I a fuck up in every one life so don't... 
[three illegible words] 
See Letter attached hereto as Appendix C.3 Trial 
Transcript, pp. 87-88. 
18. Raegan first called 911 and then called Mrs. Francis. Trial 
Transcript, pp. 86-88. 
19. Neighbors in the area had heard the gunshot and began to 
arrive soon thereafter. Police officers responded to the 
scene quickly as well. Raegan was extremely upset —almost 
3. The suicide note was recieved into evidence as part of 
Plaintiff's Exhibit 21, the police report of the suicide. Trial 
Transcript, p. 124. 
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hysterical. The entire scene was disturbing, shocking, and 
bloody. Trial Transcript, pp. 86-88, 119-21. 
20. Raegan discovered her husband's body slumped in a chair, 
with a gunshot wound to the head, made by a high powered 
hunting rifle at close range. Bleeding had occurred 
profusely from the head wound. The bullet had exited the 
skull, soiling the surrounding area. Little Ed was wrapped 
only in a towel at the time of his death. The chair in 
which he was sitting was saturated with his blood.4 When 
the body was ultimately removed, it was wrapped in a Mexican 
blanket found at the home.5 Trial Transcript, pp. 83-88, 
118-24, 334, 335. 
21. Almost immediately Raegan began to have symptoms of labor. 
By 1:00 P.M., no more than 2 hours later, she was admitted 
to the Gunnison Valley Hospital. The admission history and 
physical for this hospitalization notes: 
Earlier this morning her husband committed suicide with 
a shotgun and the patient unfortunately found his body 
earlier this morning. Due to her kidney infection, 
dehydrated state, as well as pregnancy state, and 
inability to eat or drink at the present time and now 
coupled with the acute grief and stress reaction with 
the suicide of her husband she's admitted to the 
4. In one of the more macabre and appalling aspects of the 
Plaintiff's case, she sought to recover, under her conversion 
theory, for the value of this very chair. Fortunately, the judge 
refused to accept this particular item of damage, though without 
comment or analysis. 
5. Strangely, the judge awards Plaintiff damages for the 
alleged conversion of this particular item. 
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hospital for IV hydration and treatment of her 
infection. 
Raegan was admitted with a diagnosis of kidney infection, 
acute grief reaction, dehydration, and intrauterine 
pregnancy. Raegan remained in Gunnison Valley Hospital 
until Wednesday, 23 March 1994. Copies of these medical 
records are attached hereto as Appendix D.6 Trial 
Transcript, pp. 87-89. 
22. With Raegan hysterical and confined to the hospital, Mr. and 
Mrs. Francis proceeded to make arrangements for the 
disposition of their son's body. At some point during her 
hospitalization, she demanded that she be allowed to make 
the funeral arrangements. At first through their attorney, 
David S. Kunz, and again over the phone, the Francis1 
informed Raegan that they had no objection to her making the 
funeral arrangements. However, if she insisted upon so 
doing, they would not pay for such arrangements, but would 
pay their respects at the funeral home and leave it to 
Raegan and her family to do take care of. She declined this 
offer and authorized the Francis' to proceed with the 
arrangements. The Francis' proceeded to have their son's 
body cremated and held a memorial service7 with the pastor 
6. These medical records were recieved into evidence as 
Plaintiff's Exhibit 11. Trial Transcript, pp. 21-22. 
7. Mr. Springer distinguished the service the Defendant's 
had for Little Ed from a funeral, calling it a memorial service, 
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of their church on Tuesday, 22 March 1994. The following 
day, Raegan was released from Gunnison Valley Hospital. 
App. D; Trial Transcript pp. 88-91, 102-09 
23. Based upon information provided by Defendants, the funeral 
home prepared the memorial service program and had the 
obituary published in the Salina Sun. Joe Springer, the 
funeral director, obtained the information needed to prepare 
the memorial service program and the obituary from Defendant 
Ed Francis. He testified that Ed Francis told him that 
Little Ed was divorced at the time of his death. Mr. 
Francis testified that he could not recall what was said, 
understandably distraught at the death of his son. Trial 
Transcript, pp. 102-08; 349-51. 
24. In any event, under Mr. Springer's direction, an obituary 
for Little Ed was published in the Salina Sun which 
contained no mention of Raegan, Raegan!s unborn child, or 
Raegan1s two year old child. Approximately one month later, 
an obituary was published in the Provo Herald. Neither Mr. 
Springer nor Mr. and Mrs. Francis had any role in the 
publication of this obituary. Little Ed's sister, Teresa 
Ore, evidently felt that it was appropriate to provide 
notice to Little Ed's friends in Payson of his death. 
Accordingly, Teresa took it upon herself to prepare and pay 
Trial Transcript, pp. 101-102. 
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for an obituary in the Provo Herald. Again this obituary 
included no reference whatsoever to Raegan or her children. 
Trial Transcript, pp. 92-95, 102-08, 340-51, 
Following Little Ed's death, the Defendant's proceeded to 
clean the Sigurd home. Initially, they arranged for a 
specialized cleaner to clean the bloody suicide scene. His 
name was Theron B. Shaw. This was done within a day or two 
within Little Ed's suicide. As he cleaned out the home, Mr. 
Shaw questioned what was going to be done with the gun 
cabinet, broken by Raegan's mother, and the blood soaked 
chair where Little Ed had been sitting when he took his 
life. Mr. Francis allowed Mr. Shaw to take the chair and 
the gun cabinet in lieu of cash payment. Trial Transcript, 
pp. 128-32, 335-37. 
At some point, the other property in the house was removed. 
Raegan testified that she believed the property was removed 
on Saturday, 19 March 1994, although she was hospitalized at 
the time. Conversely, she also testified that after her 
release from the hospital she went back to the house and 
looked around on 24 March 1994. She looked in the window to 
the house and saw personalty therein. The Defendants 
testified that other than the broken gun cabinet and the 
bloody chair exchanged with Mr. Shaw, it was some time, 
perhaps a few weeks before they commenced cleaning the 
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Sigurd home. Trial Transcript, pp. 97, 313, 333, 335, 337, 
360-61. 
Curiously, Plaintiff's 18 March 1994 hospitalization records 
contain references to two phone calls which were upsetting 
to her. First, was a phone call from the Sevier County 
Sheriff on 20 March 1994 at 8:00 P.M. No information about 
this call is provided. Second, on 21 March 1994 at 8:30 
P.M., she received a phone call from an unidentified caller. 
She reported to the nurse that it was "^about in laws going 
to try and take my baby when born.'" No mention of funeral 
arrangements is made. No mention os calls to or from David 
S. Kunz or Defendants is made. No mention of property being 
taken is made by Plaintiff while hospitalized at this time. 
See Appendix D; But cf., Trial Transcript, pp. 88-90. 
Following her release from the hospital, on 23 March 1994, 
Raegan had no contact with the Defendants directly. She did 
not return to the home in Sigurd nor did she request 
permission to do so. Plaintiff did not demand the property 
she now claims. The Defendants proceeded to clean out the 
home placing many items, which Plaintiff seeks to recover 
for, in storage where they were held throughout the pendency 
of this litigation. Defendants disposed of certain other 
items. Yet other items were taken by Little Ed, the day 
before his death to the dump. Plaintiff's mother claimed to 
have found certain minor items which she believed belonged 
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to Plaintiff at a garage sale held by Plaintiffs many months 
later. Trial Transcript, pp. 89-100, 313, 335-39, 351-60; 
282-84/ 371-73. 
29. Plaintiff claims that 68 different items or groups of items 
were converted by Defendants. 
a. She claimed that the following items were in the Payson 
storage unit: a lawn mower, a tiller, two twin 
mattresses, a night stand, a shovel, a hoe, two rakes, 
a microwave oven, a kitchen table and four chairs, a 
refrigerator, a daybed, bunk beds, toys, and a stereo. 
Of these items, Plaintiff specifically testified that 
she traded the daybed with the Defendants for the 
mattresses. She stated at trial that she did not end 
up with either the daybed or the mattresses. Trial 
Transcript, pp. 197-98. The trial court awarded 
damages for both the mattresses and the daybed, even 
though Plaintiff's own testimony clearly established a 
right to only one or the other. See App. A, Memorandum 
Decision, pp. 10-11, items 13 and 32. 
b. Plaintiff claimed Defendants simply took and disposed 
of other items: a CB radio, a tool box, a barbeque, 10 
blankets, 6 sheet sets, 6 pillows, 3 afgans, a 
comforter, 2 full mattresses, a 40 piece sterling 
silverware set, 2 alarm clocks, a safe, 2 coolers, a 
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bank account,8 money in Little Ed's wallet, money in a 
piggy bank, a cutting block table, an entertainment 
center, 20 towels and 15 wash rags, a baby crib, 2 
laundry baskets, a 35 millimeter camera with 
accessories,9 kitchenware, kitchen towels, an electric 
drill and bits, two tablecloths, food, a love seat, two 
rocking chairs,10 two oil lamps, a lantern, a wooden 
gun case,11 five guns, three lamps, two lamp shades, a 
child safety gate, one-hundred phonograph records, two-
hundred cassette tapes, sixty video tapes, a Nintendo 
game, two wooden rockers, a coffee table and two end 
tables, two Mexican rugs,12 twelve wall pictures, a 
shop vacuum and two other vacuums, and Little Ed's and 
Raegan's wedding rings.13 
8. The bank account was an account maintained in the names 
of Little Ed and Defendant Patricia Francis. Plaintiff was 
unable to establish any claim to this account and was awarded 
nothing therefor. 
9. The trial court specifically found Plaintiff's testimony 
regarding the value of this camera to be incredible. App. A, pp. 
13-14. 
10. One of which was the chair Little Ed was sitting in 
when he killed himself. 
11. This is the gun cabinet Plaintiff's mother broke during 
the 16 March 1994 disturbance. 
12. One of these rugs was used to wrap Little Ed's body 
when he was taken out of the home. 
13. The trial court made no finding as to the disposition 
of these rings, although Defendant Ed Francis specifically 
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c. Still other items were fixtures attached to the Sigurd 
home: fencing materials, the ceiling fan, curtains and 
curtain rods, and an automatic coal feeder called a 
stockermatic. The court disallowed any recovery for 
these items as well as items which were simply 
unaccounted for: a box and receipts, electric toys, 
five additional guns, and a gun rack. 
Trial Transcript, pp. 176-216; 25J-76; 315-47. 
30. Raegan was hospitalized numerous times following 23 March 
1994. These hospitalizations included: 19 April 1994 (7 
days), 26 April 1994 (6 days), 12 June 1994 (1 day), 14 June 
1994 (1 day), and 22 June 1994 (2 days). Raegan had a 
normal delivery of a healthy child on 23 June 1994. The 
April 26, 1994 hospitalization was in the psychiatric unit 
of Mountain View Hospital. With the exception of the 2 6 
April 1994 Mountain View hospitalization, these related 
primarily to her pregnancy. See hospital records, admitted 
at Trial as Plaintiff's Exhibits 7-16. 
31. Raegan's hospitalizations note her depressed state. Each of 
these hospitalizations note the guilt Raegan was feeling and 
the hard feelings between her and the Defendants. The 
hospitalization immediately following the suicide of Little 
testified that he AJ Little Ed through his ring into the Sevier 
River which was ad_ .cent to the Sigurd home and saw Raegan with 
her ring during her deposition. Trial Transcript, pp. 344-45. 
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Ed is of central importance. The doctor notes that Raegan 
is "almost hysterical" and has feelings of guilt. However, 
not one of these hospitalizations notes any distress over 
the fight with Defendant Patricia Francis on 16 March 1994, 
the funeral arrangements, or the alleged conversion. These 
allegations came later —after the lawsuit was filed. Id. 
App. D; App. E. 
In between hospitalizations, Raegan managed to retain an 
attorney. A probate action was filed on 13 April 1994. She 
was appointed personal representative of Little Ed's estate 
by 19 April 1994, following her first hospitalization, and 
prior to her second. The present action was filed on 4 May 
1994, two days after her discharge from Mountain View 
Hospital. See Court file. 
At trial a licensed clinical social worker named Randy 
Chesley testified. Mr. Chesley works for the Central Utah 
Mental Health/Substance Abuse Center. He testified that 
Raegan was severely depressed and referenced his medical 
records, which note that the primary causes of her 
depression were Little Ed's suicide and the shock at 
discovering the bloody suicide scene although he does note 
the ill feelings with Defendants, funeral arrangements, and 
concerns over Little Ed's possessions. App. E; Trial 
Transcript, pp. 220-21, 226-27. Mr. Chesley's notes of 4 
April 1994 state: 
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The client reports that just over 2 weeks ago her 
husband committed suicide by shooting himself with a 
hunting rifle. She was the first to arrive at what was 
an apparently very grizzly [sic] scene. She almost 
immediately went into labor and was hospitalized for 5 
days [sic] at Gunnison Valley Hospital. The labor 
successfully abated. The client is blaming herself for 
the suicide stating that she and her husband had 
separated 36 hours earlier. She states that her in-
laws have become very antagonistic toward her, 
initially accusing her of murdering her husband and 
later blaming her for his suicide. She reportedly was 
not permitted to attend the funeral and is not being 
given access to any of her husband [sic] possessions. 
Notes attached hereto as Appendix E.14 
34. Mr. Chesley further noted that Plaintiff had been afflicted 
with suicidal ideation since adolescence. He noted that she 
lived with her mother and her mother's eighth husband; that 
one of her prior seven step-fathers had attempted to molest 
her and that her older brother had molested her from age 10 
to age 14. She became pregnant at age 15 and married Little 
Ed at age 17. Mr. Chesley notes that the treatment 
justification is "extreme symptoms of depression and anxiety 
after the recent suicide death of her husband." He notes 
the two "work areas" to be "difficulty adjusting to the 
extreme circumstances of the death of her husband" and 
"trauma of having discovered husband." I&. 
35. Mr. Chesley also testified that in his experience informing 
a man that the paternity of his wife's unborn child was not 
14. Mr. Chesley's notes were recieved into evidence at 
trial as Plaintiff's Exhibit 35. Trial Transcript, p. 225. 
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his, would also be a severely upsetting event. Indicating 
that Raegan's remarks could certainly have played a role in 
Little Ed's decision to take his life. Trial Transcript, 
pp. 227-29. 
36. At trial, Raegan sought recovery under three theories: 
a. First, Raegan sought recovery for intentional 
infliction of emotional distress. While Raegan had no 
clear theory as to exactly what actions by the 
Defendants precipitated this severe emotional distress, 
the trial court concluded that the exclusion of the 
Plaintiff from the planning and execution of the 
funeral, taking control of property, denying her 
recognition as the spouse, was the conduct which was 
outrageous and intolerable. 
b. Second, Raegan sought recovery for conversion of 
personal property. Raegan presented her evidence 
regarding this conversion, primarily by reference to a 
list attached hereto as Appendix F. This document 
listed items of property she believed were converted 
and opposite of each item was a dollar amount 
representing Raegan's guesstimate of value.15 As to 
15. For clarity, it is not Defendant's claim that the trial 
court erred in admitting such uninformed evidence as Raegan 
presented, but that such evidence standing alone as it did, 
cannot substitute for the required evidence of fair market value 
or by itself provide any basis for the determination of fair 
market value. 
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most of these items, Raegan testified that these 
figures merely represented her uninformed opinion as to 
worth. In no instance did Raegan present testimony as 
to the nature or condition of the item, its fair market 
value, or any other specific information relative 
thereto.16 Notwithstanding this lack of evidence 
regarding fair market value, or information from which 
fair market value might be deduced, the trial court 
awarded Raegan the sum of $12,102.02 for conversion. 
Third, Plaintiff also attempted to recover for "money 
had and received." Her claim in this regard was for 
money she alleged contributed to the down payment of 
the Sigurd home as well as $11,000 which she claimed 
Little Ed used to purchase a vehicle which was retained 
in the name of Defendants prior to their marriage. The 
court concluded that her burden of proof on these 
claims had not been met explaining: 
Plaintiff failed to meet her burden of proof as the 
$11,000. This I will explain. In order for me to make 
calculations about the $11,000 and its relationship to 
the 198 6 GMC Jimmy, I need to know more about the 
vehicle. I need to know such things as its purchase 
price, its value as of March 18, 1994, its rental value 
16. Appellants use the term "guesstimate" advisedly. The 
trial court found that at least one of her values, regarding the 
camera, was a mere guess, and rejected. App. A, Memorandum 
Decision, pp. 13-14. A review of her testimony, however, shows 
her valuation evidence to have been uniformily comprised of 
hopeful guesses. Trial Transcript, pp. 176-216, 250-76. 
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and its disposition since March 18, 1994. I have no 
information about these topics. 
App. A, Memorandum Decision, p. 17. The court 
concluded that because there was insufficient 
information regarding this matter, Plaintiff failed to 
carry her burden of proof and accordingly refused 
recovery on this claim. App. A; Trial Transcript, 
passim. 
37. The court entered judgement in favor of Plaintiff in the sum 
of $23,050.26, which was calculated as follows: The sum of 
$12,102.0 for conversion, the sum of $7,500.00 for 
intentional infliction of emotional distress, and the sum of 
$3,348.24 for pre-judgement interest at the rate of 10% per 
annum on the amount awarded for conversion from 18 March 
1994 through 22 January 1997. Finally the court awarded 
post-judgement interest on the entire amount, $23,050.26, 
from the date of the court's memorandum decision. App. B. 
Summary of Arguments 
Plaintiff failed to show that any actions of the Defendant 
were outrageous. There was no finding and no evidence that any 
action, outrageous or not, caused Plaintiff's emotional 
disturbance nor was there evidence that Defendants directed any 
behavior towards her. Accordingly, Plaintiff did not present 
evidence necessary to sustain recovery for intentional infliction 
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of emotional distress and the judgment should therefore be 
reverse. 
Similarly, Plaintiff's evidence regarding conversion was 
also wanting. She failed to present any evidence of fair market 
value or that she had made a demand for the return of her 
property. These failures preclude recovery. Also she failed to 
establish the property she claimed was taken was actually hers. 
Again, there is insufficient evidence to sustain the judgment 
granting recovery for conversion. Having failed on both claims, 
the judgment should be reversed in its entirety. 
Argument 
The issues in this appeal revolve around the two theories 
upon which Plaintiff prevailed at trial: intentional infliction 
of emotional distress and conversion. These issues will be 
discussed separately. 
I. Plaintiff Is Not Entitled to Recover Any Damages for 
Emotional Distress 
In order to recover for intentional infliction of emotional 
distress, a plaintiff must demonstrate that she has actually 
suffered sever emotional distress, which distress was actually 
and proximately caused by the acts of the defendant; that the 
defendant ^~ted, either intentionally or recklessly, for the 
purpose of causing emotional distress, which act was directed 
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towards plaintiff; and which act is extreme, outrageous, and 
intolerable in that it offended generally accepted standards of 
decency and morality. Retherford v. AT&T, 842 P.2d 967, 975-76, 
977 n.19 (Utah 1992); Russell v. Thomson Newspapers, Inc. 842 
P.2d 896, 905 (Utah 1992); Samms v. Eccles, 358 P.2d 344, 347 
(Utah 1961); White v. Blackburn, 787 P.2d 1315, 1317 (Utah Ct. 
App. 1990). 
A. Outrageous?: Does Defendants' Behavior Make the 
Reasonable Person Exclaim "Outrageous"? 
The first issue on appeal, a mixed question of law and fact, 
is whether the Defendants' actions were sufficiently shocking to 
support recover for the tort. The trial court's memorandum 
decision does not analyze what it considered outrageous, or make 
any comparison to generally accepted standards of decency and 
morality- Rather, the court concludes that the Defendants' 
behavior was outrageous in three respects: first, in excludion 
her from the funeral planning and execution; second, in failing 
to mention Raegan; and third, in allegedly converting property. 
None of these acts are outrageous in the sense required to 
support a finding of intentional infliction of emotional 
distress. 
Outrageous actions are those which offend "the generally 
accepted standards of decency and morality." Retherford, 844 
P.2d at 977 n.19. In determining outrageousness, the Utah courts 
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have referred freely to the Restatement (Second) of Torts, § 46, 
cmt. d (1965), which provides that the required conduct is 
"behavior so outrageous in character and so extreme in degree as 
to go beyond all possible bounds of decency." The Restatement 
further provides that only behavior "in which the recitation of 
the facts to an average member of the community would arouse his 
resentment aaainst the actor and lead him to explain "outrageous" 
provides a suificient basis upon which to predicate recovery. 
Id. The Retherford court explained that only behavior which 
constitutes "extraordinarily vile conduct," conduct that is 
"atrocious, and utterly intolerable in a civilized community" is 
sufficient to constitute a predicate for recovery. Retherford, 
844 P.2d at 977 n.19. 
Assume17 all of the bad behavior presented by Plaintiff to 
have been true as marshalled in the statement of facts: Assume 
uhe was wrestled to the ground on 16 March 1994 by Little Ed's 
105 lb. mother. Assume the Defendants hated her and blamed her 
for Little Ed's death. Assume that Defendants excluded her from 
the funeral service and deliberately failed to include her in 
either obituary. Assume that they wrongfully excluded her from 
her property. Given the surrounding circumstances, the death of 
Little Ed, Plaintiff's own behavior, the emotions, the problems, 
17. In other words, for the purposes of this section, 
assume all the facts as Plaintiff alleged or testified or which 
otherwise support the judgment. 
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the anger, can it be fairly said that these action cause the 
average person to exclaim outrageous? The reaction to reading 
these facts is more fairly characterized as pity than outrage. 
If so, Plaintiff's judgment for intentional infliction of 
emotional distress should be reversed. 
Reviewing these facts separaely shows even more clearly the 
deficiency in the court's rationale. Given the feelings between 
Plaintiff and Defendants, not mixing at the funeral seems the 
soul of discretion, not an outrageous act.18 Far better to keep 
these parties separated than allow them to again reach critical 
mass in a circumstance as emotional as the funeral. This is not 
extreme, but reasonable. 
Excluding Raegan from mention in the obituaries presumes 
that Defendants had a duty to speak regarding Raegan.19 There 
was no such duty nor should one be imposed. Moreover, Plaintiff 
was able to obtain public recognition through her own effort in 
getting Mr. Springer to publish a second obituary and by the 
public probate filing. Plaintiff was not the only one to suffer 
18. It is somewhat difficult to understand how Plaintiff 
was excluded by the Defendants from the funeral. She gave them 
permission to proceed and was not released from the hospital 
until the day after the funeral. Statement of Facts, 11 22, 28; 
App. D; Trial Transcript, pp. 88-91, 102-09. 
19. Such a finding implicates free speech concerns, because 
it would amount to compelling Defendant's to speak on pain of 
civil liability. Such is not the role of this tort, nor should 
it be the policy of this State. But cf., App. A, p. 15 ("They 
denied her any recognition as the decedent's spouse."). 
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a loss in this case; Defendants were themselves distraught over 
the loss of their son and very upset wit. Plaintiff. They did 
not wish to recognize her. This is behavior which occurs in 
families, tragically, every day. Such behavior is neither 
extreme or outrageous. 
The conversion is a separate tort for which Plaintiff has 
sought recovery. The trial court appears to have concluded that 
the mere conversion was sufficient to sustain recovery for 
intentional infliction of emotional distress.20 When Defendants 
entered the house to clean it out, they carefully separated 
property they believed was theirs from property they believed was 
Plaintiff's. Plaintiff's property was placed in storage and 
never again touched. This indicated a careful regard for 
Plaintiff's property rights, not an extreme or outrageous 
disregard for them.21 
Even assuming these events occurred in the manner in which 
the Plaintiff claims, it is impossible to say that they are 
singly or in concert so utter vile, so malignant, so far beyond 
the realm of civilized behavior, as to make the reasonable person 
exclaim outrageous. Because the behavior complained of is not, 
20. App. A, Memorandum Decision, p. 15 ("They took control 
of her property anddid with it as they pleased.") 
21. For the purpose of this section of the brief, assume 
Defendant's action constituted conversion. Even if a conversion 
occurred, its occurrence was such that no outrageous acts or acts 
intended to cause any emotional distress happened. 
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on any objective measure, outrageous, the judgment regarding 
emotional distress should be reversed. 
B. There Was No Evidence to Establish Causation and 
Therefore the Judgment Should Be Reversed 
The second issue is the issue of causation. Of course, 
proof of proximate cause is essential to Plaintiff's intentional 
infliction claim. Samms, 358 P.2d at 347. In this case, the 
trial court made no finding of proximate or actual cause and 
there is no evidence from which proximate cause could reasonably 
be found. To the contrary, the evidence, even viewed most 
favorably to the judgment, is that Little Ed's suicide and 
finding Little Ed's body actually and proximately caused 
Plaintiff's emotional trauma. 
Proximate cause is "that cause which, in natural and 
continuous sequence, (unbroken by efficient intervening cause), 
produces the injury and without which the result would have never 
occurred. It is the efficient cause - the one that necessarily 
sets in operation the factors that accomplish the injury." 
Mitchell v. Pearson Enters., 697 P.2d 240, 246-247 (Utah 1985), 
quoting State v. Lawson, 688 P.2d 479, 482 n.3 (Utah 1984), as 
cited in Bansasine v. Bodell, 927 P.2d 675, 676 (Utah Ct. App. 
1996) . 
Often a difficulty in claims of infliction of emotional 
distress is pinpointing the time the severe emotional distress 
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occurred, Retherford,. 844 P.2d at 975-76. In evaluating the 
nature and causes, actual and proximate, of emotional distress, 
pinpointing the time of accrual is essential. The trial court 
did not identify or analyze when this di ess occurred. 
Fortunately, however, the record allows a precise time to be 
determined. 
In the present case Plaintiff suffered severe emotional 
distress on 18 March 1994 when she found Little Ed's body.22 In 
response to this acute distress she had immediate physical 
manifestations, including premature labor. In response to this 
distress she immediately and promptly checked herself in to the 
hospital. In response to this distress she had several 
subsequent hospitalizations. 
Defendants did not cause the death of Little Ed. Little Ed 
took his own life. Guilt over her behavior towards Little Ed was 
the primary cause of Plaintiff's emotional distress. Plaintiff's 
medical records and the medical testimony presented at trial 
amply demonstrate this. See Statement of Facts, 11 33-34. 
Plaintiff suffered as a result of seeing the scene of her 
deceased husband's body and the trauma that scene naturally 
22. Plaintiff claimed to have been battered and cuckolded 
by Little Ed, but never reported this to any medical or law 
enf cement personnel, notwithstanding many opportunities. She 
fou with Little Ed and his parents, was present for other 
suiw-ie attempts by Little Ed, had Little Ed deny her access to 
her property and money on 16 March 1994, but made no complaints 
of emotional disturbance between Little Ed's tragic suicide. 
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entailed. Defendants played no role in setting this scene,23 
Plaintiff also suffered emotional distress as a result of having 
lost her husband and being left husbandless and with two children 
to care for. Id. 
Proximate cause is the cause which in natural and continuous 
sequence produces the alleged injury and without which the injury 
would not have occurred. Bansasine, 927 P.2d at 676. In this 
case, without the death of Little Ed, Plaintiff would not have 
suffered severe emotional distress. But for Little Ed's death, 
Plaintiff would not have suffered any emotional distress; his 
suicide was the actual cause of her distress. Equally 
significant, it is Little Ed's suicide and the death scene and 
her immediate reaction thereto which was the substantial, if not 
exclusive, cause of her emotional trauma. She immediately went 
into premature labor; she had a hard time breathing immediately. 
She reacted with shock and fright and two hours later at the 
hospital, the doctor noted that she was still "nearly 
hysterical." Little Ed's death was thus the event which, in a 
natural and continuous sequence, caused Plaintiff's emotional 
distress. Little Ed's suicide and her view of the scene were the 
actual and proximate causes of Plaintiff's distress.24 
23. Plaintiff played a significant role in causing this 
scene herself. She testified that the purpose of her comment 
regarding paternity was to cause Little Ed to become upset. 
24. 
Assuming any of the events prior to 18 March 1994 caused any 
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It is curious to note that the memorandum decision provides 
no finding of fact or facts to support a finding of causation on 
causation. The court merely recites the standard for intentional 
infliction of emotional distress and merely states that "the 
standard has been met". App. A, Memorana^in Decision, p. 15. The 
trial court then recites the actions of the Defendants and 
concludes that there conduct was "outrageous and intolerable" and 
offensive to "some of the most highly prized of our societies 
values." The trial court merely concludes, without any 
subsidiary facts, that "Plaintiff suffered emotional distress by 
the hands of Defendants." The Court does not disclose any fact 
relating to causation or which demonstrates any causal nexus at 
all between the actions the Court concludes are outrageous and 
the severe emotional distress which Plaintiff concededly 
suffered.25 Having failed to establish the necessary causal 
emotional distress whatsoever, Little Ed's death is 
unmistakablely a significant intervening cause of Plaintiff's 
distress. Bansasine, 927 P.2d at 677. As to events following 
the death, the record is quite clear that without Little Ed's 
dec n, no emotional distress of any kind would have occured. 
Little Ed's death, grievously unforeseeable to anyone, was the 
cause —perhaps an intervening cause— of Plaintiff's distress. 
Kilpatrick v. Wilev, Rfiin & Fielding, 909 P.2d 1283, 1293 (Utah 
Ct. App. 1996). 
25. In drafting Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law it 
is incumbent that the Court disclose sufficient facts to allow 
the reviewing court to ascertain the analysis the Court went 
through. Salmon v. Davis County, 916 P.2d 890, 901 (Utah 1996); 
Butler, Crockett & Walsh Dev. Corp. v. Pinecrest Pipeline 
Operating Co., 909 P.2d 225, 231 (Utah 1995); Acton v. J.B. 
Deliran, 737 P.2d 996, 999 (Utah 1987). In the present case the 
Court has not done so. There are no Findings of Fact sufficient 
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link, and having failed to present any evidence of one, the 
judgment respecting intentional infliction of emotional distress 
should be reversed. 
CLX. Defendant Had No Intent to Cause Plaintiff Any Harm 
Finally, proof of intentional or reckless behavior is 
necessary to support a finding of intentional of emotional 
distress. It is not merely behavior which is intentional but 
behavior which is intentionally or recklessly directed towards 
the Plaintiff for the purpose of causing the Plaintiff emotional 
distress which must be proven. Samms, 358 P.2d at 347. 
In the present case this standard has not been met. 
Defendants undertook certain actions. Plaintiff and Defendant 
Patricia Francis had a physical altercation on the 16th of March 
prior to the death of Little Ed. Following Little Ed's death, 
Defendants1 removed property from the Sigurd home. In planning 
the funeral, following consultation with the Plaintiff, 
Defendants made funeral arrangements. Defendant Ed Francis said 
Little Ed was divorced at the time of his death and therefore 
Raegan was not mentioned in the obituary in the Salina Sun. 
Defendants made it clear that they did not wish Plaintiff's 
presence at the funeral. Finally, Plaintiff testified that she 
called the Defendants' home and spoke with Defendants daughter, 
to allow a determination of how the Court concluded causation was 
met. 
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Teresa, who told her not to call there ever again.26 None of 
these actions were taken with the intent or with reckless 
disregard for the likelihood of causing Plaintiff any emotional 
distress. 
The physical altercation was simply that: a reaction to the 
Plaintiff's own aggressive behavior. Clearly the funeral 
arrangements were taken as a result of the Defendants own 
understandable grief. Defendants believed, not without some 
basis in fact and logic, that Plaintiff's own ill-considered 
statements to Little Ed caused him to take his own life. 
Accordingly, they did not wish her presence at the funeral, in 
their home or in their lives. However, there is no evidence that 
these actions were taken with the intent of causing her any 
emotional distress. These actions were taken by Defendant in 
their own grief. Plaintiff did not establish that these actions 
were in any way directed towards her or reckless with regard to 
her. 
II. Plaintiff Failed to Establish the Elements of a Conversion. 
26. Holding Defendants responsible in any way for this 
comment by Teresa or Teresa's publication of the Provo Herald 
obituary is simply contrary to any just imposition of liability. 
The undisputed te3timony was that neither Defendants nor the 
funeral home director, Mr. Springer, had any involvement in the 
publication of the Provo Herald obituary. Statement of Facts, 1 
24; Trial Transcript, pp. 102-08, 340-51. 
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In this case the trial court improperly awarded Plaintiff 
damages for an alleged conversion of personal property. The Utah 
Supreme Court has held that "a conversion is an act of wilful 
interference with a chattel, done without lawful justification by 
which the person entitled thereto is deprived of its use and 
possession." Allred v. Hinkley, 328 P.2d 726, 728 (Utah 1958). 
In the present case the trial court made three errors with 
respect to its award of damages for alleged conversion. These 
errors are: (1) a failure to require the appropriate type of 
proof of loss by the Plaintiff; (2) failure to require Plaintiff 
to demonstrate that a demand for the return of her property had 
been made; and (3) the failure of Plaintiff to demonstrate that 
all of the property she was claiming was actually hers. 
A. Plaintiff Provided No Evidence or Proof of Fair Market 
Value 
In the present action Plaintiff failed to present any 
evidence whatsoever of fair market value. In Utah,"[a]s a 
general rule, the measure of damages for the conversion of 
property is the value of the property at the time of conversion 
plus interest." Broadwater v. Old Republic Surety, 854 P.2d 527, 
531 (Utah 1993); Lowe v. Rosenlof, 364 P.2d 418, 421 (Utah 1961). 
"And, furthermore, that proof of the value of the converted 
property is essential to recovery of damages on the theory of 
conversion." Lowe, 364 P.2d at 421; Lym v. Tompson, 184 P.2d 
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667, 670 (Utah 1947); Kniahton y. Manning, 33 P.2d 401, 404 (Utah 
1934). In the present case no evidence of fair market value was 
presented. Plaintiff consistantly testified as to her opinion or 
guess as to value or more commonly Plaintiff testified as to the 
expense she and her late husband expended in purchasing such 
item. See Statement of Facts 1 29; Trial Tranascript, pp. 176-
216, 250-76. As to many other items, which were either owned by 
the Defendants or gifts from the Defendants, Plaintiff was wholly 
unable to give any value other than her own uninformed opinion. 
In no instance did Plaintiff testify as to the condition, nature, 
type or extent of property she lost. Plaintiff simply provided 
no evidence of fair market value nor any evidence from which fair 
market value could be fairly deduced. 
Plaintiff's testimony regarding the allegedly converted guns 
is typical. Plaintiff testified that her deceased husband owned 
ten guns at the time of his death.27 She was unable to testify 
as to their manufacturer, caliber, whether they were rifles, 
shotguns or pistols, their make, age, or condition. In fact, 
upon cross examination Plaintiff explicitly testified that she 
believed any gun to have an average v .ue of $400.00 and simply 
27. In contrast, Defendant Ed Francis testified that Little 
Ed owned one guns at his death, a Rossi .22 pump action. He had 
possession of a few others belonging to his father, namely, the 
.30-30 used for the suicide, Browning 20 gauge shotgun, a 
Remington Model 870 shotgun, a Stevens .410 single shot shotgun, 
and a Winchester .270 bolt action rifle. Trial Transcript, pp. 
338-39. 
-37-
arrived at her valuation of the guns by that average value. 
Plaintiff further testified that she had never purchased a gun, 
had never been present when a gun was purchased, had never sold a 
gun and had never had any experience whatsoever with guns. 
Plaintiff's evidence of value was simply nonexistent.28 
Predicating recovery upon such evidence is simply wrong. This 
error should be corrected and the judgment reversed. 
Market value is "the price for which an article is bought 
and sold and for which there exists a demand in the market place 
and the legal definition of that price is retail not wholesale." 
Winters v. Charles Anthony, Inc., 586 P.2d 453, 454 (Utah 1978). 
28. One of the trial court's findings was that "[a] local 
automobile dealer testified that [Defendant] Edward M. [Francis] 
sold him a rifle for $400.00." App. A, Memorandum Decision, p. 
8. This transaction occured in November, 1994, many months after 
the events of this lawsuit and was unconnected with any of the 
parties other than Defendant Ed Francis. However, this 
transaction did occur, as part of a trade. Notably, the trade, 
and Mr. Larsen's testimony specifically identify the gun involved 
in the trade, a Smith & Wesson Model 1700 .30-06 hunting rifle. 
The dealer described it as a common hunting weapon with no 
special features. Trial Transcript, pp. 147-49. This gun 
actually belonged to John Ore, the Defendants' son-in-law, and he 
asked Defendant Ed Francis to trade it on his behalf. Trial 
Transcript, pp. 242-43. In another transaction, Defendant Ed 
Francis gave Little Ed and Raegan $400.00 for a handgun. She 
testified that this money was actually paid, but nevertheless 
seeks recovery for that gun. Trial Transcript, pp. 57-58. 
Pretending that these two transactions support the 
Plaintiff's proposition that therefore all guns are worth an 
average of $400.00 is ludicrous. It is like arguing that because 
one might buy a 1988 Porsche for $20,000, and then buy a 1995 
Oldsmobile for $20,000, that therefore a particular 1979 Pontiac 
is also worth $20,000. Such evidence would not support a finding 
regarding the fair market value of the automobiles and yet that 
is exactly the evidenc% the trial court accepted. These types of 
sales transactions are hardly fungible. 
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It is significant that in other cases where the Court has 
considered what constitutes fair market value, the Court has been 
presented with evidence from appraisers or persons knowledgeable 
in the field of the particular item in question. Cf. Winters, 
586 P.2d at 454. In this case, no knowledge or expertise was 
presented; only uninformed, self-serving, inflated29 statements. 
In the case in question, Plaintiff's evidence of value 
failed notably. There was no basis for the Court to determine 
any of the fair market value of any of the items claimed by the 
Plaintiff. The only evidence of value presented by the Plaintiff 
were mere guesses.30 Yet, evidence of fair market value is 
29. Plaintiff attempted to claim that a camera was worth 
$2,500.00. She testified as follows: 
Q: [By Mr. Taylor] Item No. 37 is a — is an expensive 35 
millimeter camera, with lenses and bag; is that an 
item, or are those items that Little Ed had before the 
marriage? 
A: Yes. They were. 
• * * 
Q: Why such a high value on it, Raegan? $2,500? 
A: Because a lens is very expensive. He had a whole bunch 
of lenses in it. . . . 
Q: What was the make of the camera? 
A: I don't know. 
Trial Transcript, pp. 199-200. She further testified that she 
did not know whether the camera was German or Japanese or 
American. Xsi* at 269. Later, Defendant Ed Francis testified 
that he purchased the camera for Little Ed at a pawn shop in 
Payson for $50.00. The trial court concluded that Plaintiff's 
testimony regarding the camera was not credible. App. A, pp. 13-
14. However, the remarkable point is that the testimony 
Plaintiff gave about the camera was no different than all the 
rest of her conversion testimony. It was fundamentally the same. 
30. It is interesting note in many instances when 
Defendant's were able to pla a value on particular items of 
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necessary to sustain a conversion claim. Failure of such 
evidence is a mortal flaw. In this case, there was no evidence 
of fair market value and no evidence from which such value could 
be gleaned. There being no evidence to sustain the judgment, it 
should be reversed. 
B. Having Failed to Make Any Demand for the Return of 
Property, Plaintiff's Conversion Action Will Not Lie 
Before a plaintiff may maintain a cause of action for 
conversion, there must be a demand for the return of the 
allegedly converted property. Christensen v. Pugh, 36 P.2d 100, 
102 (Utah 1934). Cf. General Leasing Co. v. Manifest Corp., 667 
P.2d 596, 597 (Utah 1983); Heiselt Const. Co. v. Garff. 225 P.2d 
720, 721 (Utah 1950). In this action, no demand was ever made by 
the Plaintiff for the return of her property. 
Under Utah law "conversion consists either in the 
appropriation of a thing to the party's own use and beneficial 
enjoyment, or in its destruction, or in exercising dominion over 
it, in exclusion or defiance of owner's right, or in withholding 
possession of the property from the owner under a claim of title 
inconsistent with his own." Christensen, 36 P.2d at 102. In the 
property, the Court almost invariably accepted the Defendant's 
valuation rather than the Plaintiffs, tending to show that the 
Court generally disbelieved or at least disfavored the 
Plaintiff's testimony. See, e.g., Memorandum Decision, page 
numbers 10, 13, items numbers 4, 5, 18, 30, 35, 37, 42, 47, 49, 
56 and 60. Attached as Appendix A. 
-40-
present case, much of the property Plaintiff claims was converted 
was actually held by the Defendants in a storage unit. This 
indicates not an intent to destroy or to exercise dominion or 
control for their own beneficial use, but to hold it pending the 
resolution of the dispute; to hold it for Plaintiff's benefit. 
On March 18, 1994, when Little Ed shot himself, the house 
needed to be cleaned immediately. The Plaintiff had left the 
premises without speaking with the Defendants and had herself 
checked into the hospital. There was ill will between the 
Defendants and Plaintiff, stemming from the fight which the 
Defendants had witnessed the evening previous to Little Ed's 
suicide and as a result of the Plaintiff's quite unjustified 
assertion that her unborn child was not Little Ed's. Leaving the 
house uncleaned was out of the question. Defendants took it upon 
themselves to have the house cleaned. Given the situation and 
their ownership of the house, this was not an unreasonable step. 
They commenced to clean out the house. Some items such as 
the refrigerator, mattresses and beds were held in storage for 
Plaintiff to recover at her request -a request which never came. 
Other items were clearly owned by the Defendants such as the guns 
and were disposed of by them.31 Yet other items were apparently 
worthless and were disposed of by giving them to various persons. 
31. In an insight into the Defendant's grief, Defendant Ed 
Francis meant to dispose of all his guns and did so by throughing 
them to the bottom of Fish Lake. Trial Transcript, pp. 339-40. 
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For example the chair in which Little Ed was seated when he 
committed suicide and the broken gun cabinet were given to the 
individual who cleaned the house. Again, not an unreasonable 
procedure. 
At the time this cleaning commenced, Plaintiff had abandoned 
the property; she did not intend to return. App. A, Memorandum 
Decision, p. 17. She had not paid rent for the month of March, 
1994 and was absent and Defendants did not know when or if she 
would return. When one is absent without notice to the landlord 
from premises for more than 15 days without the payment of rent, 
and there is no sign of occupancy other than the presence of 
personalty in the premises, an abandonment is presumed. Utah 
Code Ann. § 78-36-12.3(3) (a) (1996). The property was presumed 
abandoned. Without a demand, no conversion could occur at that 
point. Christensen, 36 P.2d at 102. Defendants put Plaintiff's 
property in storage and were served with a Complaint. 
Many of the items which Plaintiff seeks recovery for were 
simply not in the house when the Defendant's cleaned it up. For 
example, alarm clocks, the baby crib, bunk beds, laundry baskets, 
oil lamps, lantern, lamp shade, children's toys, safety gate, 
records, cassettes, video tapes, were all gone by the time the 
Plaintiff entered the premises. The only reasonable explanation 
for this discrepancy presented to the Court is that these are the 
items Little Ed took to the dump the day before his suicide. The 
trial court simply ignored this information and in conjunction 
-42-
with its other erroneous rulings regarding the value of the items 
simply assessed damages for such items against the Defendants. 
Plaintiff had some obligation to affirmative seek the return 
of property she believed to be hers prior to the commencement of 
an action. She did not. She abandoned the premises and in 
cleaning the premises, Defendants segregated the property which 
appeared to be Plaintiffs and held it. Absent a demand under 
those circumstances, Plaintiff's conversion action will not lie. 
The judgment should therefore be reversed. 
Request for Oral Argument 
Because of the fact-intensive nature of this case and its 
wider legal significance regarding the law of intentional 
infliction of emotional distress and conversion, 
Defendants/Appellants respectfully request that oral arguments be 
held in this matter and that the court issue a fully-reasoned 
opinion. 
Conclusion 
This case is about tragedy and the loss of a loved one. It 
is tragic for all involved and all the more tragic because it has 
moved into the courts at all. There was no outrageous behavior 
by the Defendants which caused any distress for the Plaintiff. 
She was distressed, and understandably so, by the view her eyes 
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beheld on the morning of 18 March 1994. That was the cause of 
her distress. She should not recover anything against the 
Defendants. 
Plaintiff has failed to adequate demonstrate her conversion 
cause of action. Her evidence has been unsatisfactory and 
insubstantial. There is no evidence of fair market value or of 
demand. She should recover nothing of the Defendants for 
conversion either. 
The Plaintiff has failed to demonstrate her case and the 
trial court went awry. This Court should restore the balance and 
bring closure to a painful episode. The judgment should be 
reversed. 
DATED this ^ ^ day of November, 1997. 
STEVENSON & SMITH, P.C. 
Attorneys for Defendants/Appellants 
By: ^<Z^t^^ ^^^c^4r-
Brad C. Smith 
Mailing Certificate 
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Cast No. 940600116 
AJBigned Judge: DAVtU L. MUWfcK 
This case was tried to the Court without a jury, in Richfield, Utah on November 14, 1996. 
The parties were present with counsel, Mr. Taylor for the plaintiff; Mr. Kunz and Mr. Smith for 
the defendants. At the conclusion of the trial, the matter was taken under advisement. 
This case had it's beginning some 40 years ago when the defendants, Edward M. Francis 
and Patricia Blundon, were married. In the course of their lives together, Mr. and Mrs. Francis 
had 3 children, Thomas Edward Francis, Theresa Rebecca Ore and Edward Kenneth Francis. 
Edward Kenneth is now deceased, but his life was, at one time, connected with that of the 
plaintiff The facts which will be described herein gave rise to the complaint which the plaintiff 
KM30LW 
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made. 
1. Edward K. was born on November 8,1968 in Belie Fourch, South Dakota. He graduated 
from Payson High School, Payson, Utah, in 1986. He died at his own hand on March 18, 
1994. During his lifetime he suffered from a disability called Mild Spastic Cerebral Palsy 
of the left side. 
2. In July of 1993, Edward K. became acquainted with the plaintiff, Raegan Harris.* At the 
time she was a young lady of about 17 years of age. She had never been married. Edward 
K. had been married once, but was divorced. Raegan had a 1-year-old daughter. Edward 
K. had no children. He had lived in Payson, Utah County, Utah during his first marriage. 
3. Edward K. and Raegan began dating. He bought a diamond ring for $299.97 on August 
25, 1993 and gave it to her. 
4. They became intimate. She became pregnant by him on September 11,1993. 
5. On November 12,1993 Edward K. and Raegan were married. They resided in Raegan** 
I note that the death certificate contains two possible emx* which may be of interest. The death 
certificate was received in evidence as exhibit #3. Blank #9 contained therein shows the nsmo of ihc 
surviving spouse. Blank #17 shows the namootfthc decedent's father. Doth names are probably 
misspelled The plaintiff never did tell the Court at trial how to spell her name, but I note that her 
pleadings list her name with the spelling Raegan, while the death certificate apclli it Regan. 
At the trial the defendant Edward M. told me that hianarae was Edward Me]vin Francis. The death 
certificate refer* to him as Edward K. Francis, Sr. 
It has been my experience that these type of spelling errors and inconsistencies arc the bone of 
genealogists and record keepers. If the parties are inclined to makechanges.it would be easier todo 
so now rather than later. 
mm\M 
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parents* home until after Christmas of 1993, then lived in Edward M and Patricia's home. 
6. While living in Raegan's parents' home, Edward K. became despondent and threatened 
suicide with a handgun that he owned. Racgan called Edward M, who came and took the 
gun. 
7. Both Raegan and Edward K had accumulated certain items of personal property before 
November 12, 1993. 
8. Raegan owned a 1979 Chevrolet Impala automobile for which she had paid $2,000.00 and 
against which there was an $800.00 lien to the seller. Edward K. owned a Suzuki Samurai 
sport-utility vehicle. Edward K. also owned a horse trailer. 
9. Edward K. received a monthly disability check from Social Security. For a time, he was 
employed as a carpet layer. For a time, Raegan worked as a waitress. 
10. In November of 1993, Edward K. sold the Suzuki and the horse trailer for $11,000.00. He 
and Raegan gave that money to Edward M. and Patricia. They used that money and some 
other money and property of their own to purchase vehicles, one of which was a 1986 
GMC Jimmy sport-utility. It was titled in defendants' names, but Edward K and Raegan 
had exclusive use and possession of it. 
11. After living with Edward K/s parents for a time, they (the parents) decided to assist the 
young people in the purchase of a home. 
12. Edward K. paid the lien against the 1979 Chevrolet, and then it was sold for $1,200.00. Of 
M1I301J* 
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that money, $1,050.00 was given to Edward M. to help toward the down payment on the 
home. 
13. Edward M agreed to buy the handgun that he had taken from Edward K The purchase 
price was to be $400.00, if the money was used as part of the down payment on the home. 
14. The home was purchased by the defendants* The monthly payment was to be $314.00. If it 
was paid faithfully by Edward K. and Raegan, then they would become the owners at the 
end of the purchase contract. The young family moved into the home on January 19,1994. 
15. Edward K. and Raegan paid for the utilities. The account with Utah Power & Light was in 
Patricia's name. 
16. They purchased a refrigerator on January 19,1994. 
17. They purchased an entertainment center on January 26, 1994. 
18. They made a trip to Ernst Home & Nursery in Spanish Fork, Utah on March 11,1994. 
They purchased $500.00-worth of fencing materials and gardening and yard maintenance 
items. 
19. A fence was installed at the home. 
20. Others items were purchased and installed in the home, such as a ceiling fan, curtains and 
curtain rods. 
21. Edward K and Raegan probably had a rather unstable relationship, with periods of 
happiness interspersed with periods of stress and unhappiness. Raegan said that Edward 
Ml 1191M 
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K, hit her on more than one occasion. Raegan threatened to leave several times. Edward 
K. was unfaithful to Raegan. 
22. In any event, on Wednesday, March 16,1994 a series of events commenced which led to a 
portion of the claims made in this case. On that date, Raegan had determined to terminate 
the relationship with Edward K. and had begun packing and arranging her things to be 
moved out of the home. During the course of the morning, Edward K called his parents 
and Raegan called her parents, Bill and Connie Allred of Aurora, Utah, all of whom 
eventually arrived. 
23. Raegan called 911. A deputy sheriff arrived on the scene at the request of the dispatcher. 
He later left and then, after some time had passed, other law enforcement officials 
appeared including the sheriff. All of the non-police people engaged in shouting, name-
calling and threatening. Eventually, the situation was brought to a conclusion and Raegan 
left with her parents and with a few items of personal property. As she was walking away, 
Raegan said to Edward K., "You're not the father!" 
24. Later in the evening Raegan called Edward K. and the two met and went for a ride. They 
talked about resolving their differences. She told him that he was the father of the child. 
Raegan stayed with Edward K. at the Sigurd home where they talked all night. In the 
morning of the 17th it became clear to Raegan that they would not resolve their 
differences. At about 10:00 AM Raogan took off her wedding rings, gave them to Edward 
N i t * } * 
ID: _JHN Z?'y7 12:54 No. QUI P. 07 
DECISION, Case number 940600116, Page -6-
K , and asked him to take her to her parents' home, which he did. 
25. Later that day Edward K. spoke with his father, who went to the Sigurd home where he 
gave Edward K. a sleeping pill. The two visited for a time. 
26. On March 18, 1994 Raegan traveled from her mother's home in Aurora to the family 
home in Sigurd. She arrived at about 11:00 a.m. Finding the front door locked, she went 
around to the back, entered the home and called Edward K.'s name and received no 
response. As she looked through the home she eventually discovered his remains in the 
living room. He had apparently committed suicide. 
27. A neighbor arrived because he had heard the fatal shot. Raegan called Patricia and then 
called 911. Law enforcement officials arrived. Raegan was distraught and went to stay at 
the neighbor's home. The defendants arrived. 
28. Tom Jensen was one of the policemen. He found Edward K/s wallet. It contained 
$515.00. He later gave the wallet and its contents to Edward M. 
29. Raegan was admitted to the Gunnison Valtey Hospital in Gunnison, Utah on March 18, 
1994 at 1:00 PM. She was discharged and left the hospital on March 23, 1994. 
30. In the meantime, Edward M. and Patricia arranged for funeral services. The services were 
conducted on March 22, 1994 in Salina, Utah. The funeral was directed by 
Springer/Turner Funeral Home. A printed program was used at the services. Raegan did 
not attend. 
MI m i * 
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31. One of the owners of the funeral home is Mr, Joe Springer, who testified at trial that he 
arranged to have the program printed and to have the obituaries published. He followed 
the directions given to him by Edward M. in preparing the program, and in preparing the 
obituaries, which were to be published in the local newspaper, the Salina Sun, and in the 
Daily Herald, a newspaper published in Provo, Utah County, Utah. 
32. Raegan's name does not appear in the funeral program, nor does it make any reference to 
the decedent's marital or parental status. Raegan's name did not appear in either obituary. 
33. On March 19 or 20,1994, defendants* lawyer called Raegan in the hospital and then 
Edward M. called. In essence, he said, "The funeral has been arranged. You can't come." 
34. Later during the hospital stay, Raegan called Edward M.'s home to inquire about the 
status of her personal property. She spoke to Theresa. Theresa told her never to call there 
again. 
35. Raegan went to the Sigurd home on March 24,1994. She didn't go inside, but looked 
through a window. She could see items of personal property. 
36. Within a few days of the funeral, defendants retrieved all the items of personal property 
from the home. They have had the exclusive possession and use thereof until the present 
day. Some has been converted to their own use and some has been in a storage unit in 
Payson, Utah. 
37. Raegan's mother happened to drive by defendants9 home in Salina. They were having a 
MtlttlJt 
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yard sale. The mother thought she recognized some of Raegan's things there, so she had a 
friend go and make some purchases. The friend returned with some of Raegan's property -
- pots, pans, and towels. 
38. A local automobile dealer testified that Edward M. sold him a rifle for $400.00. 
39. On April 19, 1994, Raegan was appointed by this Court to serve as the personal 
representative of Edward K.'s estate. 
40. Raegan has been hospitalized as follows: 
a. March 18, 1994, Gunnison Valley Hospital, 5 days; 
b. April 19, 1994, Gunnison Valley Hospital, 7 days; 
c. April 26,1994, Mountain View Hospital, 6 days; 
d. June 12,1994, Gunnison Valley Hospital, 1 day, false labor, 
e. June 1S, 1994, Gunnison Valley Hospital, 1 day, false labor, 
f. June 22,1994, Gunnison Valley Hospital, 2 days, where Raegan was delivered of a 
baby girl on June 23, 1994. 
41. I have used a word processing table as a means not only to list the items of property that 
are at issue in this case but also to indicate the Court's decisions as to source, location and 
value. These explanatory notes may be helpful in understanding the table. 
a. The table contains several columns. Each column has a descriptive phrase or word 
at the top. Two of those words require explanation. The word "source** means 
final * 
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"Nam© of the person who brought the item into the relationship." Each of the 
table cells under the heading "source" contains one of 4 alphabetic characters, E, 
R, M or U. The letter "E" refers to Edward K. The letter "R" refers to Raegan. 
The letter "M" means that the item was acquired during the marriage. The letter 
"IT means Unknown." 
b. The word "location** means the location or disposition of the item as of the date of 
trial. Each of the cells under this heading contains one of 4 alphabetic characters, 
P, D, H or U- The letter "P" means "in the defendants' possession or control at a 
storage unit in Pay son, Utah.** The letter "D** means "in the defendants* possession 
or control.'* The letter "H*' means "in the Sigurd home.'* The letter "U** means 
"location unknown." 
c. The values shown are intended to be values as of March 18,1994. In the 
"Defendants' Value" column many items are shown with a value of "$0.00," This 
moans one of two things. Either the defendants failed to give a value for a 
particular item or affirmatively alleged its value to be zero. 
d. Some items on the list were installed in the home and became part of it. In those 
instances I have shown the location to be "H" and the value to be "$0.00" to 
indicate that plaintiff will be awarded no interest therein. 
Mil*!* 
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# 
1 
! Description 1 Source 
1 1 
! Lawn mower ! M 
1 2 | Tiller 
u— j.
 A 
J 3 !CB radio 




Yt) \ Fenang (railroad ties, j M 
| j wire (12 rolls @ $27), j 
gates, supplies) | |. 1.
 1 ., 
6 | Barbecue E 
| 7 | Blankets (10) j R 
I 8 ! Sheets (6 sets) 1 R 
E 
hoi 
t i i 










Mattresses (2 full size) 
Mattresses (2 twin size) 
Night stand 
Wooden box and receipts 
Sterling silverware set (40 
piece) 
Alarm clocks (2) 
Safe (metal fireproof) 



















D j $000 


































j Value 1 Value 
$179 00 
$140 00 
! $179 00 j 
$140 00 
! $130001 $13000 | 





$0 00 j 
$90.00 
$300 00 j 
$144 00 j 
$20.001 $20.00 | 
$120.00J $120.00 
$39.991 $39.99 | 
$150.00! $150.00 1 
$80 00! $80 00 | 
$20 00 | $20 00 j 
$0 00| $0.00 I 
$400.001 $400.00 ! 
1 1 i j 
$28.00] $28.00 
$150 00' $50 00 
. _
$14:°?I ?J 4 0 0 
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ID: 1HN U :T.b No UUl P. 12 













Utah Independent Bank | 
account ; 
Money in wallet 
Ball-shaped bank (like a 
piggy bank), 5 gallon 
capacity, containing coins 
Ceiling fan 
Cutting block table 
Microwave 
Kitchen table and 4 chairs 
Refrigerator 
i 29 i Entertainment Center 
(5o> Electronic items from 
j j Radio Shack 
1 31 j 20 towels and IS 
washrags 






Wooden bunk beds 
Stokermattc 






















Value j Value 
$0.001 $14.00 



























$2r500.0oT $0.00 1 
1 1 
|. i_ j 
$1.700.00 j $515.00 ! 
$100.00 i $100.00 i 
' 1 1 
i 1 
1 f 
1 I 1 
$69.00} $0.00 | 
$120.00J $120.00 
$109.00| $109.00 j 
h 1 
$89.00J $89.00 | 
$562.06 $562.06 ! 








$105. lOj SQJfi 
1 1 
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Camera 35 millimeter 
with lenses and bag 
Skillet, blender, mixer, 
toaster, crock pot, 4 sets 
of pots and pans 
Kitchen towels 
Electric drill and bits 
Table cloths (2) 
! Food storage in pantry 
and freezer meat 
Love seat 
Rocking chairs (2), blue 
Oil lamps (2) 
Lantern 
Wooden gun case 
Guns (10) i 
Gun rack 
Lamps (3) 
Lamp shades (2) 
Children's toys 










































Defendants'! Plaintiffs 1 Court's 
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$0.001 $20.001 $20.00 
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! Cassettes (200) 
Stereo, metal, component 
! Curtains (8 sets) 
! Curtain rods (13 sets) 
; Video tapes (60) 
Nintendo and nintendo 
games 
Wooden rockers (2) 
Coffee table and 2 end 
tables 
Mexican rugs (2) 
Wall pictures (12) 
1 65 1 Shop vacuum 
1 66 I Vacuums (2) 
! 67 ! Decedent's wedding ring 



































Defendants'] Plaintiffs j Court's 
! Value • Value j Value 
i $0.00 i $2,000.00 ! $2,000.00 




| $0.00 j 
i $0.00 | 
! $52.00! $0.00 













$900.00 ! $900.00 i 
1 1 
r ^ j 







(. 4 1 
$24.00 $24.00 













e. With regard to item 37, the camera: I have chosen to use the defendants9 value 
because I was not convinced by the plaintiffs testimony. In my experience, it 
mmiM 
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would be unusual for a camera and its accessories to be worth as much as plaintiff 
stated. Plaintiff failed to give me enough information about the items to overcome 
my doubts. 
t With regard to item 56, the metal stereo: I have used the defendants' value. 
Edward M. testified that he purchased the item used and gave it to Edward K. 
several years ago. Plaintiff was unable to give much detailed information about it. 
I'm inclined to believe that plaintiffs opinion as to value is no more than a guess. 
ANALYSIS 
The plaintiff has asked the Court to order the defendants to pay her money for the 
following: 
1. For the emotional distress which was inflicted upon her intentionally by the 
defendants; 
2. For the value of personal property which the defendants knowingly converted to 
their own use; 
3. For the money which she and Edward K. gave to them toward the down payment 
on the Sigurd home and toward the purchase of the 1986 GMC Jimmy. 
Awiywapytit 
intentional Infliction of Emptigmri Pwm 
Courts in Utah are empowered to award damages for intentional infliction of emotional 
mmiM 
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distress. The defendants' conduct must be measured against a standard before such an award can 
be made. The standard has been set by our Supreme Court. It has been stated as follows in the 
case of JACKSON V BROWN. 904 P.2d 685, 275 Utah Adv. Rep. 18 (Utah 1995): 
In Samms v. Eccles, 11 Utah 2d 289,358 P.2d 344 (Utah 1961), this court 
enumerated the elements necessary for a prima facie case. There, this court stated 
that a plaintiff is entitled to damages 
where the defendant intentionally engaged in some conduct toward 
the plaintiff; (a) with the purpose of inflicting emotional distress, or, 
(b) where any reasonable person would have known that such 
would result; and his actions are of such a nature as to be 
considered outrageous and intolerable in that they offend against 
the generally accepted standards of decency and morality. 
In this case, the standard has been met. The defendants excluded the plaintiff from the 
planning and execution of the funeral. They took control of her property and did with it as they 
pleased. They denied her any recognition as the decedent's spouse. Their conduct was and is 
outrageous and intolerable. Their actions offend against some of the most highly prized of our 
society's values, namely, the recognition of marriage and family relationships, the right to own 
and possess property, and the acknowledgment of and participation in rites to be performed at 
death. 
Plaintiff suffered emotional distress at the hands of the defendants. They ought to be 
ordered to compensate her for the damages they caused. The amount should be $7,500.00. 
winoiji 
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Analysis, part ?» 
Conversion 
The defendants converted property to their own use. Some of the property was that of the 
plaintiff as an individual, while some belonged to her in her representative capacity. The 
ownership status is immaterial because, since Racgan is the sole heir of Edward K , she becomes 
the owner of all property, subject only to estate expenses. 
Defendants ought to be ordered to pay to plaintiff the value of the property converted. 
The amount to be paid is equal to the total shown in the "Court's Value" column of the table, 
above. 
Defendants have suggested that they be allowed to pay part of this amount in kind by 
returning specific items to plaintiff, This should not be allowed under the circumstances of this 
case. Too much time has passed and there is too much acrimony between the parties. Payment in 
kind would only lead to further disputes and further need for judicial assistance. This order is 
intended to resolve disputes, not create new ones. 
Analysis, part ?• 
Money had and received. 
The defendants received money from the plaintiff and her decedent. They received 
$1,450.00 which they used to pay part or all of the down payment on the Sigurd home. They 
received SI 1,000.00 which they used to pay part or all of the purchase price of the 1986 GMC 
Ml 1101M 
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Jimmy. 
Apparently, the defendants continue to own the home in Sigurd. Hence, it would be 
possible for plaintiff to obtain the benefit of the $1,450.00 payment, namely, to receive ownership 
of the home at the end of the contract term. However, the transfer of ownership is subject to the 
prerequisite that plaintiff pay each of the payments as they come due. 
It is more likely than not that the prerequisite has not been met. Although there was no 
direct evidence on this point, it appears from all that I've heard and seen that Raegan left the 
home permanently on the morning of March 17, 1994.1 assume that she has paid no money 
towards the utilities nor towards the purchase contract since then. If my assumption is incorrect, 
then perhaps plaintiffs should make a motion to reopen and to offer additional evidence. 
If my assumption is correct, then the prerequisite cannot be fulfilled and plaintiff has 
abandoned her interest in the $1,450.00. 
The plaintiff failed to meet her burden of proof as to the $11,000.00. This I wilt explain. In 
order for me to make calculations about the $11,000.00 and its relationship to the 1986 GMC 
Jimmy, I need to know more about the vehicle. I need to know things such as its purchase price, 
its value as of March 18,1994, its rental value and its disposition since March 18, 1994.1 have no 
information about any of these topics. 
While it may be that defendants ought to pay plaintiff something, I have no basis on which 
to calculate the amount to pay. 
MHMIjt 
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Hencc, plaintiff should be awarded nothing for her claim of money had and received. 
ORPER 
Mr. Taylor is appointed to draft an appropriate judgment. He should feel free to draft 
other orders that he deems appropriate. He shall submit them for execution by following the 
procedure set forth in Rule 4-504, Code of Judicial Administration. 
Dated this 2 v ~ day of January, 1997. 
JfU^ 
Dkvidl-. Mower 
District Court Judge 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
On January <23 . 1997 a copy of the above DECISION was sent to each of the 
following by the method indicated: 
Addressee Methodj 
Mr. Marcus Taylor 
Attorney at Law 
175 North Main 
Richfield. UT 84701 
€ 
Addressee Mcthod.fMnaBi,f=injWBH.fcEw) 
Mr. David S. Kunz 
Attorney at Law 
2605 Washington Blvd., Suite 
300 
Ogden, UT 84401 
^ 
tip* S; ^ /^Mjj^ 
Mll»)~ 
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IN THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SEVIER COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
RAEGAN DANIELLE FRANCIS, 
individually and as Personal JUDGMENT 
Representative of the Estate * 
of Edward Kenneth Fiaiiub, Ji., 
deceased, * 
Plaintiff. 
vs. * CASE NO. 940600116CV 
EDWARD K. FRANCIS, Sr. and 
PATRICIA BLUNDON FRANCIS, 
Defendants. 
JUDGE DAVID L. MOWER 
This case was tried to the court, setting without a jury, on November 14,1996, 
the Honorable David L, Mower, Sixth Judicial District Judge presiding, Flainciff appeared 
ID person and by counsel. Defendants appeared in person and by counsel. Evidence was 
offered and received, and the case was argued and submitted. The court then took the 
matter under advisement. On January 22,1997, the court issued a written decision wherein, 
findings and conclusion were made and entered. Based thereon, the court now makes and 
enters the following judgment: 
1. The plaintiff in tlus case, Raegan Danielle Francis, is hereby given and 
granted judgment against the defendants, Edward M. Francis and Patricia Blundon Francis, 
and each of them, for the sum of $7,500, for intentional infliction of emotional distress, 
Judgment 
Francis v. Francis et ux. 
Page - 3 -
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that an unsigned copy of the foregoing Judgment was placed 
in the United States mail, postage prepaid on the 6th day of May, 1997, addressed as 
follows: 
David S. Kunz 
Attorney at Law 
2605 Washington Blvd., Suite 300 
Ogden, UT 84401 
Secretary 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that a full, true and correct, executed copy of the foregoing 
Judgment was placed in the United States mail, postage prepaid on the day of 
May, 1997, addressed as follows: 
David S. Kunz 
Attorney at Law 
2605 Washington Blvd., Suite 300 
Ogden, UT 84401 
Secretary 
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GIHHilSOH VALLEY HCSFiT^ 
ADMISSION HTSTQRY AND PHYSICAL: 
DATE: 3-18-94 
# 11745 Raegan Francis 
CHIEF COMPLATNT: 
HISTORY OF PRESENT ILLNESS: Raegan is an 18-year-old gravida 2, para 1, white 
female who is pregnant who presents to the hospital today with a severe grief 
reaction, unable to eat, or drink, complaining of dysuria, fever, abdominal pain, 
and low back pain. Earlier this morning her husband committed suicide with a 
shotgun and the patient unfortunately found his body earlier this morning. Due to 
her kidney infection, dehydrated state, as well as pregnancy state, and inability to 
eat or drink at the present time and now coupled with acute grief and stress 
reaction with the suicide of her husband she's admitted to the hospital for IV 
hydration and treatment of her infection. 
PAST MEDICAL HISTORY: Please see her prenatal record for past medical history. 
PHYSICAL EXAMINATION: Vital signs: Temperature 98.2, pulse 60, respirations 20, 
temperature 138/88. Fetal heart tones are 138. 
Chest- Clear. 
Abdomen- Fundal height about 28, FHT 138, tender to palpation 
bilaterally, she has left-sided CVA tenderness. 
Extremities-No cyanosis, clubbing, or edema. 
Neurologic- Without focal deficits. 
IMPRESSION: 
#1. Kidney infection. 
#2. Acute grief reaction. 
#3. Dehydration. 
#4. Intrauterine pregnancy. 
MI authorize my name to be automatically affixed to this report as signifying that I 
dictated this report." 





& m m VALLEY HOSRT.V. 
DISCHARGE SUMMARY: 
# 11745 Raegan Francis 
Date of Admission: 3-18-94 
Date of Discharge: 3-23-94 
Admitting Impression: Please, refer to admission history and physical exam. 
FINAL DIAGNOSIS: 
#1. Pyelonephritis, secondary to E-coli. 
#2. Dehydration. 
#3. Intrauterine pregnancy. 
#4. Acute grief reaction, anxiety neurosis. 
HOSPITAL COURSE: This patient was admitted today in a weakened, dehydrated state, 
unable to eat and drink and nearly hysterical due to the suicide death of her 
husband earlier this morning. Workup of her urinary tract infection revealed an E-
coli urine culture sensitive to most antibiotics. She was found to be dehydrated 
and in a ketotic state with 3+ ketones and concentrated urine. White count showed 
left shift, SMA 20 non-specific. Patient was admitted to the hospital and treated 
with IV hydration, antibiotics, sedation, counselling concerning the death of her 
husband. She occasionally had a few contractions due to the pyelonephritis and 
these were treated with Brethine. Urine culture returned E-coli which was sensitive 
to Cephalosporin. She was discharged home on 3-23-94, arrangements have been made 
with Sevier County Mental Health to follow her up on counselling on the day of 
discharge. She is discharged home on Amoxicillin 500 3-times/day pushing her 
liquids and I'll see her for her next prenatal visit ir -week. 
"I authorize my name to be automatically affixed to this report as signifying that I 
dictated this report." 






3-18-94: ADMISSION NOTE: - - -
See dictated history and physical. 
Richard B.-Nay, M.D./i 
3-19-94—r" ve reviewed "her NST s t r i p s Tor" aboutf" " almos t 1-hbur "shows the" baby to be 
r e a c t s E^y~is'Ye£ciivVrtheNST" i s 
negative". V i t a l s i g n s ~ a ^ 
no acute changes"^ " " '""" " " ' " " " " 
"Richard" T37"Nw7M'.D7/fcn~ " " " " 
3-20-94—-The NST on the baby looks good, mother's vital signs are stable, continue same 
course, temperature has a maximum of 99°. 
Richard B. Nay., M.D./kn 
3-22-94—Vital signs are stabilizing, her condition is somewhat stable- We'll arrange for 
the patient to have psychiatric counselling due to the suicide of her husband and arrange 
for this after discharge from this hospital after we take care of her kidney infection. 
She's drinking fluids, taking 40-50% of her meals, we'll encourage her to take liquids. 
Richard B. Nayvi M.D./kn 
3-23-94—Patient will be discharged home today, 4/rangements a r e m a d e f o r h e r t o h a v e 
mental health counselling to deal with her grief from the suicide of her husband. 
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CENTRAL UTAH MENTAL HEALTH/SUBSTANCE ABUSE CENTER 
Intake Update 
Raegan Francis 
August 30, 1994 
PRESENTING PROBLEM: Raegan presents herself today stating that 
she recognizes the need for some out patient therapy. She 
reports symptoms of Depression and Post Traumatic Stress, as 
well as Bereavment of her recently suicided husband. In 
addition, she reports situational stress associated beginning 
with, school, living in the household of her parents,, and an 
unresolved situation with her inlaws. In addition, Raegan has 
a 2-month-old infant. Raegan reports that in May of this year, 
she admitted herself to the Pavilion at Mt. View Hospital in 
Payson with depression and suicide ideation. She noted the 
impression at that time that she was not going to have her 
treatment needs met with out patient therapy, and had been 
particularly concerned about the interval before her follow up 
appointment. She was reportedly at the Pavilion for 5 days. 
She states that she declined discharge medication due to her 
pregnancy. She adds that approximately 1 week ago, she was 
initiated on Paxil through Dr. Nay. 
MENTAL STATUS 
INTELLIGENCE: The client notes some difficulty with 
concentration and memory, however, so far, this does not seem 
to impair her ability to function at school. 
AFFECT: The client's affect was appropriate to the occasion. 
MOOD: The client reports dysphoria, guilt, crying spells, poor 
appetite, early morning awakening and diminished energy. She 
also acknowledges suicide ideation, but is denying any suicide 
intent. 
Post Traumatic Stress Disorder. 
Major Depression, recurrent, moderate, 
No Diagnosis. 
None. 
5, severe, death of husband. 

















Randy Chesly, LCSW 
Central Utah Menlal Hea 1 th /Subslance Abuse Cen Ier 
Treatment. Plan 
CI i ent Name: r a n o i :- R S H U J n Client 11 : 
04/ Gender h_ Therapist 41 46 8 Curr Date 
DSM-JII-R Diagnosis: 
Axis I: 309.89 Post Traumatic 
296.32 Major Depression, 
Axis 11: V71.09 fJo Diagnosis. 
Birth Date: 01/ 19/7 6 
AJ3JL Review by: 07/21/94 
itres Di sorder-
urrent, moderate, 
Axis III: Pregnant. 
Axis IV: Psychosocial Stressors: L^^ lJL-j _i2_t Hush aRr> • 
Severity Scale: 1-Thru-6 Rating: 5_ 
Axis V: Current GAF: 46_ Highest GAF Past Year: 6_9_ 
Treatment JustiTication/Review: Raegan reports extreme symptoms of 
depression and anxiety after the recent suicide death of her 
husband . She 1 S at risk for suicide and requires i n-. m e d i a t e 
treatment 
Treatment Methods: 
1 I n d i v i d u a l Therapy 
2 Med M«nag»mtnt II 
3 Mad tlanigamant I 
4 S k i l l s Dtvelopmtnt 
3 Alcohol & Drug 
6 Residential 
7 Family Therapy 
8 Project Change 
9 P*ych Evaluation 
10 Couple Th«rapy 
11 Medical Consult 
12 Adult Day Tx 
13 Youth Day Tx 
14 Freedom Project 
13 Other 
# 1 Short Term Work Area: Difficulty adjusting to the extreme 
circumstance of the death of her husband ._ 
Goal: Raegan wi 1 i report an absence of suicide ideaJL i pn , and a 
reduction in crying, disturbed sleep, guiit, and other symptoms of 
depression and anxiety. 
Method: 1_ Frequency: 2 x month Staff Responsible: R. Ches 1 ey
 T LCSW 
Method: JL1 Frequency: PRN Staff Responsible: Pr i va te Physician 
Method: Frequency: Staff Responsible: 
# 2 Short Term Work Area: Trauma of having d iscovered husband. 





Goa 1 : 





1_ Frequency: 2_ 
Frequency: 
Frequency: 
x month Staff Responsible: R.thes1ey
 T LCSW 
Staff Responsible: 
Staff Responsible: 







to be provided by 
:
 N/A at present. 
other agencies (agency Type of 
Long-term Goa 1 /Di scharge Plan: Raegan i_s_ expected to require 
t rea t men t of in t e rmedi a t e __du_rat j qn^_i^_^_G^i s__tg a^yo i d f u rther loss 
of functioning. She wil 1 be released from treatment when she 
reports the ability to handle depression z\nd anxiety on her o_w_n_-_ 
Prognosis: Good. 
Has client been referred to case management services? No 
Has client participated in the development of this treatment plan? 
Give reason if no. Yes 
Signatures 
T h e r a p i s t 
£jd^L Lc+j*^ 
S u p e r v i s o r 
M e d i c a l S t a f f 
CENTRAL UTAH MENTAL HEALTH AND SUBSTANCE ABUSE CENTER 
Intake Summary 
Regan Frances 
4 April 1994 
Age: 18 
CLINICAL ASSESSMENT 
CHIEF COMPLAINT: "I've been having suicidal thoughts." 
PRESENTING PROBLEM: Regan is a 7 month pregnant, 18 year old, 
white, female, of otherwise average physical description. 
The client reports that just over 2 weeks ago her husband 
committed suicide by shooting himself with a hunting 
rifle. She was the first to arrive at what was an 
apparently very grizzly scene. She almost immediately 
went into labor and was hospitalized for 5 days at 
Gunni son Va 1 1 ey Hospi tal . The 1abor successful 1y abated. 
The client is blaming herself for the suicide stating 
that she and her husband had separated just 36 hours 
earlier. She states that her in-laws have become very 
antagonistic toward her, initially accusing her of 
murdering her husband and Iater blaming her for his 
suicide- She reportedly was not permitted to attend the 
funeral and is not being given access to any of her 
husband possessions. 
ROLE PERFORMANCE: The client is essentially being taken care 
of by her family at present. 
MENTAL STATUS 
INTELLIGENCE: Regan appears to be functioning within the 
average range of intelligence. At present she is 
reporting no difficulty with memory. 
AFFECT: The client presented only slightly blunted affect. 
She acknowledged however that she is not doing as wel 1 as 
she appears to be. 
MOOD: Regan identified with the f o 1 lowing; poor sleep, 
averaging little more than 2 hours a night with recurrent 
nightmares, diminished appetite, eating generally 1 meal 
a day, crying spells, distractedness and difficulty 
concentrating, suicide ideal ion as recently p. s 2 days 
ago. Note thai the client has a history of suicide 
ideation beginning at early adolescence. Shn notes that 
her mother BT)d 2 siblings experience major depression-
Regan also noteo experiencing r<=»tru^ive recollections of 
1 he traumatic rvent , dnni nirhed interest, isolation. 
THOUGHT PROCESS: The clients communications were logical and 
goa1 oriented. 
THOUGHT CONTENT: As noted, the client is experiencing an 
abundance of guiIt, Also anger. There was no evidence 
of distortion of thought or perception, 
JUDGEMENT: The clients insight into the nature of her problem 
is reasonably good. Her motivation for treatment at this 
t ime is h i gh. 
BACKGROUND I NF0RF1AT I ON 
FAMILY HISTORY: The client is currently living with her 
mother and step-father. She states that with the 
exception of a few months she has lived continuously with 
her mother. This is her mother's 8th husband. She notes 
that 1 of her step—fathers attempted to molest her. The 
client notes that one older brother did molest her over 
an extended period between the ages of 10 and 14 years 
and only ended when the client became pregnant by her 
boyfriend. The brother reportedly shows no remorse. The 
client has 1 other brother and 1 sister. She described 
her brother as being her confidant and best friend. The 
client does not know her father. As noted, Regan became 
pregnant at age 14 by a boy who she had dated for 1 
month. She has had very limited contact with the father 
of the child. However, his parents are pressing for 
visitation of the 2 year old daughter. 
EDUCATIONAL HISTORY: The client notes that she has completed 
the 11th grade of high school. She is currently working 
on her diploma and expects to graduate this year. 
EMPLOYMENT HISTORY: Not applicable. 
ALCOHOL AND DRUG HISTORY: The client denies any history of 
alcohol or drug problems. 
MARITAL HISTORY: Regan states that she met her husband, Ed, 
8 months ago. They moved in together approximately 6 
months ago and married 4 months ago. She is 7 months 
pregnant by this individual. The relationship was 
described as having been tumultuous* Ed's family has 
disapproved of Regan apparently from the beginning. He 
had reportedly threatened suicide on several occasions. 
Regan states that Ed had no employment history, that he 
had had a disabling accident and had seemed disinterested 
i n emp1oyment. 
MEDICAL HISTORY: The client states that she's currently 
taking no medications although she was prescribed some 
Xanax to be used PRN. She states that she has not taken 
any. It is assumed that anti-depressant therapy has been 
precluded by her pregnancy- Regan noted experiencing 
some post partum depression with he first child. She 
apparently poses some risk for early delivery but 
otherwise states her pregnancy has progressed 
appropriately. Client appears to be in good health and 
denies any serious illnesses or injuries. 
DIAGNOSIS: 
Axis I: 309.89 PTSD (Note that the required i month duration 
has not yet occurred.) 
296.32 Major depression, recurrent, moderate. 
Axis II: V71.09 None, 
Axis III: Pregnant. 
Axis IV: Death of husband, 5, extreme. 
Axis V: Current 48, Highest past year 69. 
c/i^ 






























Tools, red toolbox, case 
Fencing (railroad ties, wire, supplies) 
Barbecue 
10 blankets 




2 full size mattresses 
2 twin size mattresses 
Night stand 
Wooden box and receipts 
40 piece sterling silverware set 
2 alarm clocks 
Metal fireproof safe 
Shovel, hoe, 2 racks 
2 coolers 








300 ($30 each) 
144 ($24 each) 
20 







28 ($14 each) 
150 
14 
14 ($7 each) 
2500 
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22. Money in wallet 
23. Ball bank 
24. Ceiling fan 
25. Cutting block table 
26. Microwave 
27. Kitchen table and 4 chairs 
28. Refrigerator 
29. Entertainment center 
30. Electronic items from Radio Shack 
31. 20 towels and 15 washrags 
32. Daybed 
33. Baby crib 
34. Wooden bunk beds 
35. Stokermatic 
36. 2 laundry baskets 
37. 35 millimeter camera with lenses and bag 
38. Skillet, blender, mixer, toaster, crock pot, 
4 sets of pots and pans 
39. Kitchen towels 
40. Electric drill and bits 
41. 2 table clothes 




















4 ($2 each) 
500 
Schedule of Personal Property 
























2 blue rocking chairs 
2 oil lamps 
Lantern 










8 sets of curtains 
13 sets of curtain rods 
60 video tapes 
Nintendo and nintendo games 
2 wooden rockers 
Coffee table and 2 end tables 
2 mexican rugs 
12 wall pictures 
160 




4000 ($400 each) 
50 
50 






48 ($6 each) 
52 ($4 each) 
900 ($15 each) 
300 
60 ($30 each) 
100 
24 ($12 each) 
120 ($10 each) 
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64. Shop vacuum 60 
65. 2 vacuums 100 ($50 each) 
66. Decedent's wedding ring 112 
67. Plaintiffs wedding ring 299.97 
TOTAL $25,396.12 
